"What is Happening with VIA's New Trains?"

I hear that - a lot! Though this blog thrives on facts and shies away from rumour, innuendo and opinion, dusting off dry facts and delving into detailed affidavits do not always give a clear picture of what I actually think of the whole saga of VIA's Venture implementation, having followed it as I have since the first Venture pulled into Kingston's VIA station over three years ago. The question, "What is happening with VIA's new trains?", is increasingly posed on social media and in casual conversation among passengers, pundits and rail enthusiasts. 

This 'opinion piece' or perhaps 'conclusions piece' is my best attempt at succinctly discussing the 'why' that got us all where we are today. Here's my opinion on the why, the what, the effects and the future of this CN-VIA conflict:

CN suddenly imposed crossing speed reductions on VIA Rail Canada's Venture trains on October 11, 2024. These new California-built trains now comprise fully half of VIA's in-service Corridor fleet. It seems to me that CN's overnight October over-reaching imposition of these special instructions to VIA's locomotive engineers was based on:

• a complete lack of evidence that Ventures pose more danger by not triggering warning devices at crossings than CN freights or VIA Legacy fleet trains. 
• corporate risk-aversion, CN stating that it is not prepared to take the risk of loss-of-life, however statistically low it might be.
• faulty conclusions by CN's senior management who were seemingly unaware that VIA's Venture fleet had been in continuously-expanding passenger operation on their tracks for over two years without crossing incident.
• years-old U.S. testing data involving similar but not identical trains.
• arbitrary rules like a 32-axle minimum requirement that applied only to Ventures but not Legacy trains.

CN was never able to provide actual evidence of poor 'shunting' by any VIA Venture trains, and all real-life test results and operational data have shown the opposite. CN made crossing data confidential that it was ordered to submit to the regulator, Transport Canada -  the only not publicly-available material in the entire Federal Court case. Confidential because it's conclusive, or because there's nothing conclusive?

CN remains entrenched in its anti-VIA position, insisting that VIA's new trains are the sole basis of its safety concerns with VIA. If CN were to make safety improvements like installing warning signage at affected crossings or tweaking the crossing-protection software, those actions would expose inherent shortcomings with its infrastructure - while CN steadfastly maintains is not the issue.

VIA's network is 83% owned by Canadian National, 97% by all third parties combined. Since VIA owns only 3% of the rail networks it uses on a daily basis, it must negotiate contracts known as Train Service Agreements with those networks' owners. CN is mired in a years-long negotiation with VIA over their joint Train Service Agreement that governs how all VIA trains operate over CN's tracks. CN's actions toward VIA are not those of a benevolent landlord hosting a permanent customer who pays CN about $50 million of your tax dollars per year in fees to use their tracks. CN has openly indicated that it considers VIA a burden to be removed from its infrastructure, raising concerns about whether the two railways can negotiate in good faith.

My Opinion:

CN freaked out then doubled down on its fuzzy logic 

in fear of a fatal accident occurring on its tracks.

VIA's initial legal strategy may have been flawed, with the Attorney-General of Canada confirming that CN can make internal safety rules and instructions that were therefore not subject to judicial review. Unlike CN, VIA had conducted its own testing and obtained risk assessments guided by proven safety management systems. To my eyes, the material VIA gathered to support its application for its unheard judicial review in Federal Court is relevant, conclusive and enduring, and is now being used to buttress VIA's case now before the Quebec Superior Court.

My Opinion:

VIA realized CN wasn't going to communicate, negotiate nor budge. 

VIA had to resort to the courts.

VIA's reputation suffers more each day. Locomotive engineers are fatigued and burnt out from constantly assessing and inspecting whether CN's crossing-warning technology is working as they cross 300+ crossings per train running in VIA's Corridor. On-time performance is the lowest in years. Reputational damage mounts and I've seen numerous posts from VIA customers about the constant delays and how they choose to travel by road or air instead. VIA's launch of its sparkling new trains is tarnished as each one is forced by CN to run slower and arrive late. Passengers are frustrated, angry and...leaving.

My Opinion:

VIA needs to do more to explain to its passengers 

how it is fighting the slide it's experiencing.

Transport Canada did nothing for two months after CN overreacted in October last, and still has not addressed CN's actions despite demanding and receiving thousands of pages of crossing protection data from CN over three months ago! Designing, testing, approving and implementing shunt-enhancing technology or securing funding for, and ordering, more Venture cars to satisfy CN will cost millions and take up to two years. VIA continues to seek relief within the Courts, CN continues delaying VIA's passengers needlessly. Without decisive court action in VIA's favour, the situation could continue indefinitely.

My Opinion:

Transport Canada will eventually order this situation resolved 

since it alone has a wide range of power sufficient

 to allow the Minister to address and settle CN and VIA's safety concerns.

That's as concise as I can make it. I've published plethoric posts on VIA's Venture implementation in the Corridor, then rigorously followed VIA's application for judicial review made one month after the October 11, 2024 CN-imposed crossing speed reductions. With a variety of sources including publicly-available Court documents and sources inside and outside VIA, you'll find the most comprehensive reporting on this saga here on Trackside Treasure - now totalling over 15 posts over four-plus years. Now, watch for an upcoming post detailing VIA's case before the Quebec Superior Court!

Running extra...

To paraphrase whoever paraphrased Mark Twain, 'The reports of my demise have been greatly exaggerated". VIA's Sudbury-White River run has become a bucket list item for many railfans and reports continue to swirl about their already-demise, fanned by a TRAINS magazine report that F40-HEP equipment was about to replace the Sud Budds. A recent ride by reputable rider Tim Hayman put paid to that, and I'm eagerly expecting an enlightening exposition of his excursion!

Speaking of retiring, it's been six years! Thinking back, I've ridden the Sudbury-White River segment five times, albeit aboard VIA's Canadian. In retirement, it was the CN-routed Canadian about three months after this photo was taken:

401k's are not OK, trillions of dollars of virtual value disappear. Marine One lands on the ninth hole of a Florida green land and an austere mini-motorcade of golf cards shuttles the well-heeled while Americans say, "Well, hell..." what are they going to do now as their retirement date looms. Not a tariffic situation to be in! AMANAPLANACANALPANAMA - this palindromic statement at least implied there was a plan!