Friday, November 1, 2024

Comparing VIA's LRC and Venture Implementation

November 15, 1981

Alternate post title: When Life Gives You Lemons? There is much justified concern about the implementation of VIA Rail Canada's soon-to-be 32-trainset Siemens Venture fleet. Someone asked me, I suppose due to the greyness of my hair, and the fadedness of my newspaper clippings, whether the LRC implementation had as many problems as VIA's Venture fleet is currently experiencing. 

My first impulse was to say the LRC teething troubles were much more painful, took longer to resolve, and gave VIA a much bigger black-eye than the Ventures could. Though these two technologies are separated by four decades, the railway and the passenger always want a new fleet to do well, and to be reliable. (We won't even talk about the Renaissance implementation that occurred two decades ago. There were problems, the fleet was technically not 'new' and hey, VIA got 'a good deal' on it.) Back to the LRC-Venture comparison that got me digging through the ol' dusty archives...


LRC IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES

The LRC was the first new equipment fleet ordered by VIA. Each car cost $1 million, and each locomotive $1.2 million. The sturdy monocoque, aluminum-alloy coaches were particularly noteworthy, weighing one-third less than conventional rolling stock then in use.  

The new trains entered service more slowly than expected, in part due to a seven-month strike at Bombardier in 1979. Further institutional delay was caused by VIA simultaneously having to form itself as a corporation, and the work of incorporating CN and CP intercity trains into combined operations. From VIA's 1980 annual report:

The first LRC run in revenue service was an unexpected Toronto-Sarnia run on September 4, 1981 - a busy Labour Day travel weekend that required everything VIA could muster.  Regular service between Montreal and Toronto was postponed at least twice, from October 25 to November 16 to December 18, 1981. VIA had hoped to have 50% of Corridor trains LRC-equipped by the late-spring of 1982!

Throughout the early years, the untried LRC equipment faced a host of mechanical and operating challenges. Train riders were on board for years to fix what defects they could. 

The banking system that promised higher speeds by tilting up to 10 degrees with computer-controlled hydraulic lift technology was perhaps a perfect solution to an imperfect right-of-way. The pendulum-like suspension relied on centrifugal force and gravity. Once a curve was sensed, an electric signal was sent to hydraulic actuators that tilted the coach body to the appropriate angle, returning the coach body to level after the curve. The overly-complex system required constant vigilance and was often and finally deactivated. One common problem - the cars' banking system would "lock" in the tilted position even after the track had straightened out from a curve. Removal of the banking system reduced maintenance costs and weight by two tonnes per car, thereby also reducing fuel consumption.

Problems at the cars' vestibules were the result of the pocket-style doors that were designed to slide back and 'into' the coach body/wall once actuated by a key. Almost simultaneously, hydraulic pistons would deploy the vestibule steps outward. The technology was often confounded by winter ice and snow. When eventually deactivated, the steps would drop down with a heavy 'clunk' on platforms all along the Corridor! Unlike conventional equipment's 21-inch gap that required a step box, LRC stairs reached within 10 inches of low-level platforms, 

Minor defects were even mentioned in VIA's 1981 annual report, during the trial service:
VIA's 1982 annual report mentioned: "During this introductory phase, a number of technological problems related to the train systems were encountered which were addressed jointly by VIA and the manufacturer, and refinements effected gradually." 

Publicly, VIA said the problems were not major bugs, only basic design problems (which took five years to work out). Behind the scenes, the manufacturer said the railway was not maintaining the new sets properly, while VIA said that it was the trains' high-tech complexity caused failures. During evaluation on Amtrak, shop forces exhibited indifference to what they viewed as oddball technology that would never find a home on Amtrak. 

A search through the contemporaneous rail enthusiast newsletters of the day (1981-84) reveals few articles on LRC implementation issues, just one brief trip report: On August 14, 1983 prior to departure from Toronto Union Station, an LRC coach on VIA No 46 was tilting on its own. A two-hour delay ensued while a first-generation MLW switcher brought replacement from the coach yard. The uncoupling and coupling, overseen by three shop staff made departure for Ottawa 1'50" late.

A wheel-bearing failure on December 2, 1983 led to all 50 cars then in service being sidelined six days later for bearing inspections. Bearing replacement was done around the clock, with a goal of having 80% of the fleet in service by December 19. Replacement bearings were stockpiled for use in the next 50-car order.

Some of the other problems the LRCs became known for, requiring more than 200 modifications to be made in the first three years of service:
  • the old Alco-designed 251F, 16-cylinder engine leaked initially
  • humped trucks bounced, leading to an 80 mph speed-restriction until new trucks were ordered from Dofasco, and shocks and dampers finally adjusted
  • a wheel falling off
  • troublesome door-opening mechanism, doors jamming shut 
  • engines that wouldn't restart 
  • frozen toilets and burst pipes
  • false readings from the on-board hotbox-monitoring system
  • corrosion in washrooms
  • locomotives' wheelbase had to be reprofiled to eliminate vibration at high speed
  • hydraulic fluid in the banking system had a tendency to overheat
  • problems with brake components
  • plastic hinges breaking off overhead luggage bins
  • anti-skid devices shorting out after taking the pounding of daily service, causing skies
  • snow finding its way into boxes
  • battery chargers shorting out
  • overly-complex HEP system
  • problematic Stanford alternators
  • right-angle drive cooling fan
  • cars tilting on their own!
In April 1986, 50% of the LRC coach fleet was shopped. Two years later, electrical problems in April 1988 meant that LRC locomotives couldn't run solo, instead requiring a 'B' unit or steam generator unit. From March-May 1992, axle problems led to Operation Axle. Most of the LRC locomotive fleet was stored by 1991. 

In 1981, VIA needed the LRC trains to be a success at a critical time in its history when trends and technology like Head-End Power (HEP) were changing rapidly in the passenger rail industry. 
  • The popular Turbo trains were still reliable, but would be pulled from service the same year as the LRC entered revenue service and scrapped.
  • VIA's first-generation locomotives were increasingly unreliable, replaced by the F40 fleet just in time, five years later.
  • VIA's conventional fleet was steam-heated, originally requiring steam locomotives that had been scrapped twenty years ago. Steam generators were old technology; the 30 year-old equipment in the harsh Canadian climate was affecting reliability. The Turbo and Tempo had already proven that non-steam/HEP technology was more reliable.
The implementation of the LRC fleet enabled wider changes within VIA's operations, some based on passengers' expectations as more intercity travel shifted to airlines. In 1981, visitors to LRC open houses were quoted saying things like, "I'm impressed because it's designed like the interior of an aircraft", "It looks rather pleasant like air transport brought down to earth", and "I like the idea of serving you the meals right at your seats":
  • Though there had been discussions about converting VIA's car fleet to Head-End Power, VIA's plans for that project were not announced until 1987, and the first HEP cars wouldn't entered service until 1991.
  • After the drastic 1990 cuts, VIA decided its blue & yellow car fleet would not be converted to HEP and its future fate was sealed.
  • VIA was keen to incorporate the LRC's at-seat cart service, with modular kitchen components and no need for meal-service cars or the staff they required. 
  • The same for baggage cars and club cars. Roomy baggage racks, overhead-storage bins and purpose-built, consist-ready VIA1 business-class service was part of the attractiveness of the LRC design.
  • Within a few years, baggage cars, meal-service cars, and operating crews supplied by the railways would disappear as VIA became fully responsible for on-board service crews, the replacement of conductors by service managers, and locomotive engineers becoming VIA employees.
VIA looks back with fondness on the LRC era in the first decade of 'Great Moments on VIA Rail's History' on its webpage: "1981 - The first Light, Rapid, Comfortable (LRC) trains were delivered to Windsor Station in MontrĂ©al, making travel more practical and appealing to passengers." Even though LRC cars had racked up their first million miles each by 1991, they are soldiering on, having undergone major refurbishing at IRSI in Moncton 15 years ago. 

COMPARING LRC AND VENTURE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION

LRC -- There was a lengthy 13-year development phase by the LRC consortium (Alcan, Dofasco and MLW-->Bombardier) from 1968 to 1981.  The prototype JV-1 locomotive and coach made a 7,000-mile round trip to the US Department of Transportation test facility in Pueblo, CO in 1974. On November 13, the set completed a 1,094-mile test of 120 laps of the test-track at the average speed of 96 mph, returning back to Canada on December 1, 1974. 

Test trains were operated by VIA between Montreal-Toronto and Montreal-Quebec City for months. No sales were made to other passenger operators, despite extensive evaluation on Amtrak's North-East Corridor from 1980-82. The debut of the LRC in the Corridor was delayed multiple times due to reliability issues.

Venture -- Siemens' Venture cars were derived from European Viaggio Comfort cars from 2008, first ordered by Florida's Brightline in 2014, entering revenue service in 2018. In 2017, a coalition of states with state-supported Amtrak routes ordered 137 Venture railcars through its contractor Sumitomo Corporation: seven trainsets for California, and 88 cars for Illinois, Michigan, and Missouri (Amtrak Midwest). In 2021, Amtrak announced their order for 83 trainsets to replace the aging Amfleet and Metroliner cab-cars. In 2022, it was Ontario Northland placing an order for three three-car trainsets.

The Corridor implementation of the Venture fleet has been on-schedule, phased, with new sets arriving monthly. The first set arrived in Montreal on September 29, 2021. Initially kept close to the MMC, Montreal-Ottawa service debuted on November 8, 2022 followed by Ottawa-Toronto service on September 21, 2023 and some Southwest Ontario service beginning in October, 2024. 


VENTURE IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES

Problems with the Venture implementation have included locomotives shutting down due to a single component. Something simple like a filter not being changed on schedule has caused units to shutdown and cause delays. Since the equipment is new to crews and vice versa, these incidents may be due to lack of familiarity with the new trains. There are sporadic non-systemic mechanical issues. Siemens staff at the MMC seem to have been able to cope when adequate stores are available under a coupler-to-coupler fifteen-year service contract. Major incidents with VIA's Ventures are occurring twice per week, minor incidents every day. One recent recurring report includes the main computer in 2800-series car that manages the entire train - randomly tossing a bunch of errors to the head-end: locked axle, bearing, door open, etc., simultaneously.

VIA CEO Mario Peloquin was recently quoted as saying, "We are halfway through fleet implementation. Relationship between supplier and us is working well. Complex process to receive, test, commission and put in service the new trainsets. It is on-par with delivery of any new rolling stock."'

CONCLUSIONS

One major difference between the eras in which LRC and Ventures were introduced? Social media, propagating every Venture incident across multiple social media platforms, with uninformed posters calling the new equipment 'crap'. While Venture incidents do make the news today, I haven't seen any credible articles pointing to specific, recurring failures with just one component or technology. 

Here are some conclusions based on the above comparisons:
  • LRC technology was completely new and was a guaranteed sale to VIA. Venture technology chosen by VIA after the other railways and other countries bought similar Siemens trains.
  • There were certain LRC systems that were known to be troublesome across the fleet. There seem to be no 'Achilles heels' causing systemic problems with the Venture fleet.
  • Without LRC or Venture failure rates, it's tough to ascertain which implementation was 'better'.
  • The LRC implementation was problem-plagued and to a degree far more widespread and took longer to remedy than that of VIA's Ventures, at least so far.
  • Whatever difficulties there were with the LRC car fleet, they have been rebuilt and are still in service 40+ years later. The locomotives only lasted one-quarter to one-half that long. Fortunately, the F40 could operate with LRC car fleet. Venture trainsets are stand-alone and not operable with other locomotives.
CLIPPINGS

These contemporaneous 80's-era news clippings, many from the Canadian Press, show some of the problems, some of the hype and the long trail that LRC implementation travelled through Canadian passenger rail history. 
December 26, 1981

December 30, 1981

April 26, 1982

December 3, 1983

December 12, 1983

Both March 14, 1984


An excerpt from the December 3, 1984 article below:

January 8, 1985

The history of VIA's Venture implementation is still being written. Unlike the LRC, technology that has already been proven elsewhere by Siemens should ease the teething troubles. By comparison, the LRC implementation looks to have been Like a Root Canal!

Running extra...

While preparing this post, I was able to unearth a lot of previously-unearthed material that needed unearthing. Check out this L-R-C post on the LRC for more! Not to make Trackside Treasure all about VIA, but here are two other posts (links below and in the right sidebar) that being updated on a daily basis because a lot of what is making news on Canadian rails right now is related to VIA. You will find next to nothing (no, it's nothing) on Trackside Treasure about VIA's HFR project. I think that stands for High Fantasy Rail, but I need to do some more reading. 
Not to make this Running extra all about VIA, but the VIA Historical Association's 6539 (below - Chris Greenlaw photo) is pretty much breaking the internet today. The first time a head-end has broken the internet, since the tail-end of a Kardashian broke it last time.

You've made it to the bottom of Trackside Treasure's 900th post. If you've been here since the very beginning, you're probably pretty tired. And 16 years older than when you started. I'm very tired and 60 years older than when I started...life. It's been a great ride and I can now die happy, resting not so much on my considerable laurels and burgeoning pension income amplified by picking up empty beer cans in our adjacent pedestrian pathway, but more than that, secure in the knowledge that I have provided Canadian train enthusiasts with information and photos of the subjects of their enthusiasm with very little mission-creep though I've been tempted to remake it into a political blog, a blog about my considerable creamer-top collection or to translate the whole thing into Latin, and maybe now a blog called Run-On Sentences!

Thursday, October 24, 2024

The Sad Saga of VIA Train 622

A major media black-eye for VIA occurred on Saturday, August 31, 2024 when VIA train No 622 was marooned for several hours at Laurier-Station, QC on CN's Drummondville Subdivision on its way from Montreal to Quebec City. An expected three-hour trip became 14, with ten of those hours spent stationary.

VIA's rescue train consist from VIA's Montreal Maintenance Centre was symbolled 308. The consist was 901-3478-913 (top photo) hauling No 622's Set 10 back to the MMC. The bidirectional units aid in hospital train operation, and the car between qualifies the movement as a 'train' therefore able to operate at higher speed. Lion Liu was out over two days - sunny August 31 and rainy September 1 - photographing the travails of this train and kindly shared them with me.

The federal Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities (TRAN) can study any aspect of the management and operations of Transport Canada and Infrastructure Canada, as well as any legislation, programs or policy areas administered by the Minister of Transport and the Minister of Infrastructure. The scope of issues related to transport, infrastructure and communities is quite broad and includes:
  • federal programs and policies for air, rail, road and marine transportation;
  • Crown corporations (e.g., VIA Rail Canada Inc., pilotage authorities and the Jacques Cartier and Champlain Bridges Incorporated), administrative tribunals and agencies (i.e., Transportation Appeal Tribunal and the Canadian Transportation Agency), and shared governance organizations (e.g., port and airport authorities) within the Transport and Infrastructure ministers’ portfolios; and
  • a range of issues affecting productivity and quality of life in Canadian cities and communities (e.g., traffic congestion and community infrastructure).
In an initial meeting on September 6, the sad story of this VIA train was told, acting as a springboard to hauling VIA Rail Canada execs into a hearing room. The contention, as raised at this 75-minute TRAN committee meeting - "A meeting requested pursuant to Standing Order 106(4) to discuss a request to undertake a study of the most recent travel chaos and the continued problems across Canada's passenger transportation systems." 

Some of the main points of discussion follow:
Over the Labour Day weekend train 622 was stuck for 10 hours - the committee wants to ask for meetings, with little communication from VIA. The committee wishes to dedicate three meetings to investigate, starting the week of September 16 to hear from Transport Canada officials, VIA leadership/CEO, the Minister of Transport and Quebec Liberal lieutenant Pablo Rodriguez for a minimum of two hours each. The Committee members also sought to condemn the federal government's inability to fund passenger service, linking the December 24, 2022 stranding of a VIA train at Cobourg, that 40% of trains late in 2023, and the past "nine years of travel chaos".

There was discussion, "debate arose thereon...", with amendments made to the motion to make sure it included only facts, that the Committee hear from passengers affected, and that the Committee share the letter from the [previous] Transport Minister to VIA Rail already sent. You can read the full meeting minutes here. (Don't think I'm going to become the parliamentary correspondent for Trackside Treasure or attend even one Commons committee meeting. I can do so right from the comfort of my sofa, right here. Sofa, so good!) It's just that this story has legs, it's not the first time a VIA train has been stranded, followed by rancorous calls-to-action, but it is the first time with a Venture set, and certainly the first time a Venture stranding has reached this high level of Parliamentary concern and dare I say, action!

The following messages were posted on September 11 by the earnest BC MP Taylor Bacharach. A certain amount of irony exists in the message - they'll pay for your trip. Of course, a wag then said you'll be late 10 hours to the hearing if you travel by VIA Rail!
The meetings were to be held during the week of September 16, although this schedule got considerably lengthened by almost one month. 

TRACKSIDE TREASURE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

I decided to sit in (at least, virtually) on these meetings, to follow them, to provide limited transcripts of some of the more interested exchanges between committee members and witnesses, in the interest of the oft-sought transparency! I suggest reading this lengthy post only if you're really interested in the incident, the response, and most importantly, the highlights. My all-meetings-in-one transcript does not include the parsing, pausing and politicking of the official minutes, although they are linked to below. 

My overall impressions of the meetings:
  • the VIA leadership did their best to show they were doing something. Sure, there were talking points in evidence, but also some useful nuggets of information elicited.
  • the union leadership did their best to show that VIA wasn't asking for, or listening to, their concerns, although it seemed they did not discuss the incident with their own union members on-board. They were clearly concerned about their members being the target of criticism from passengers.
  • the passenger was a chill dude, not like the irate ones often quoted in descriptions of the delayed train. His statement about leaving 6-8 hour window to make connections using VIA Rail stuck in the committee members' memories and was often cited subsequently. 
  • the Minister of Transport and her staff did their best to show that their oversight role did not include leading VIA through operational potentialities and solving their operational problems.
  • the format seems similar to US Congressional meetings where precious minutes are allotted to each questioner and there is the potential for hotseat/gotcha moments. 
  • the format does not seem conducive to garnering information, and at times strayed into scoring political points, though generally collegial and parliamentarians seen to be doing something.
  • the proceedings are efficiently and comprehensively documented, fully translated and made available to the public in various formats - our tax dollars at work!
Eventually, a committee report will be written and I hope to share some key recommendations from the committee as a postscript. Perhaps VIA Rail's own report would be more informative, but will it be made public?

Some of my editorial comments appear in this post [in square brackets].

--- SEPTEMBER 17 MEETING ---

First was an in-camera two-hour meeting on Tues. September 17.  A budget of $10,950 was approved to fund the study of the August 31, 2024 incident. It was agreed that the committee invite the Minister of Transport and the Minister of Housing, Infrastructure and Communities to appear for two hours each, before the end of October 2024.

--- SEPTEMBER 19 MEETING ---

"Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the committee on Friday, September 6, 2024, the committee is commencing its study of passenger rail service and the Via Rail Canada incident on August 31, 2024."

The second meeting of the week was Thurs. September 19 (1345-1720h) re: the August 31 No 622 incident with three witnesses from VIA Rail Canada Inc. Mario PĂ©loquin - President and Chief Executive Officer,  Rita Toporowski - Chief Service Delivery Officer and Denis Lavoie - General Counsel. 
I have transcribed some of the back-and-forth from the webcast of the meeting, bearing in mind I am NOT a trained transcriptionist (here are the minutes. I'm maybe a train transcriptionist, though!) then regrouped the questions (asked in random order) by general topic heading. 

The meeting began with Peloquin saying the event was unacceptable and noted that VIA has commissioned an independent investigation, led by General Counsel Lavoie, that will lead to an in-depth review of its emergency management action plan. In the interim, the following corrective measures have been implemented by VIA:
  • Corridor train delays will be assessed in real-time and implement evacuation if feasible.
  • training requirements for all employees when dealing with difficult situations.
  • revising communications protocol with Transport Canada officials to enable rapid exchange during major events.
  • launch a comprehensive assessment to examine exactly what led to this event that involving a new Siemens Venture set. 
All of the above precluded premature comments from Peloquin at this hearing, though he did apologize on behalf of VIA Rail Canada to the passengers affected.

Questions from committee members, with answers by Mario Peloquin (MP) or Rita Toporowski (RT) as appropriate:

EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO 622 

-likening Aug 31 event to Lac-Megantic tragedy. No 622 stranded near Hwy 20 where there were buses and towns MP: August 31 was definitely an isolated incident, but one is too many. What we've discovered so far...

-RT: Since 2022, we've learned need to take better care of passengers, look as protocols with alternate transportation, offer food and water on stranded trains. Communication on train was frequent but info on rescue was lacking and caused issue on train. Failure was in escalation of failure. Team working on problem....there were two mechanical failures. First took two hours to resolve, then train moved 30 metres, then secondary mechanical failure. What can we do to fix train to move it as quickly as possible. Contacted 10 bus companies, none available. CN was in constant communication, but VIA train was closer to move affected train. We needed to escalate quicker.

-you've put changes in place but there is still no plan. The willingness to unload passengers. Is it your evidence that passengers should have been evacuated from 622? MP: We put a protocol in place to ensure evacuation is started when a situation can put passengers on a train for too long. That varies depending on circumstances. We should have evacuated those passengers much, much earlier.

- 622 was far worse than Cobourg - mechanical failure is more predictable than an ice storm. Will five hours be the maximum delay? We ordered supplies from outside to resupply the train. What can you offer to Canadians to say this will not happen a third time? MP: We have 20,000 train starts per year, with 80% arriving within 30 minutes of scheduled time. A good record. Measures we have implemented will go a long way to prevent similar incidents. 

-could people leave if possible? MP: We are always doing security assessments for our passengers. If you come out of a train that is stopped, it can be difficult for seniors, those with reduced mobility, hard to walk on tracks. Easiest way to disembark is on platform. RT: In this case, the pizzas were ordered but not delivered until a safe location was reached. 

-there is a communication issue with passengers. RT: Information wasn't satisfactory as to where train was going to go. Transfer of passengers from one train to another took an hour. What can we do to get emergency services to the site?

-two additional trains affected: VIA No 26 for 1.5 hours and and VIA No 24 for 5.5 hours. Based on media reports, latter train's passengers only got bag of pretzels and bottle of water. Is a meal served after a certain period of time? RT: after 45 minutes, we provide pretzels, protein bars, cookies, then again after next 45 minutes. Those are our emergency supplies. 

-not enough food provided to passengers from aboard train. RT: pizza was ordered the minute they realized train had run out of food.

-will you add compensation to host railway and passengers? MP: We have a compensation protocol for the passengers on 622, 24 and 26. No conversation with CN yet with regards to compensation. Will come later if there is one. 

VIA'S RESPONSE re: ITS REPUTATION

-Bachrach: Passengers want confidence that problems are being worked out. Looking forward to hearing your plan. Is evacuating train something new? Other plans do not seem new. Could passengers have been evacuated? MP: We would have taken steps quicker. Location was not safe to evacuate - elevated roadbed and forest, passengers with mobility challenges. Need to move train to safe location to evacuate. 

-what is acceptable amount of time to be stranded? MP: We normally handle situations effectively. We will evacuate passengers behind a freight train derailment. 

-did VIA staff follow the protocols? You have many protocols for stations and onboard. Do you keep a log of all actions taken during an emergency? MP: We have a control centre that takes care of all communications and events. 

-can we see the control log of actions and activities? Who is the first person that gets called during an event? MP: different people up to Toporowski, she alerts Peloquin. Situation Centre at Transport Canada gets advised, MP advises office of the Minister and VIA Board. Chief of Police is involved in protocols and is aware. Disruption initially is communicated to control centre and team is put together to respond. 

-Bachrach: 2022 and 2024 incidents were both on holiday weekends. MP: Yes, people take holidays. Staff complement is not reduced at Operations Control centre and onboard trains as well. 

-in Europe, surplus locomotives are stationed at intervals for rescues. MP: We operate differently here. We don't have a supplement of locomotives that we can store around the country. We use majority of rolling stock we have every day. 

-what is the plan to restore public trust? MP: customers keep coming back, confidence of travelling public is still there. We are addressing this problem seriously. 

-you said all gaps have been identified and corrected. When will we receive results of internal investigation? MP: investigation still not completed due to several complicated steps. We are digging deep into all those. We have an independent inquiry that is underway. The mechanical failure is still under investigation. Lavoie: in the fall, we will be able to publish findings of the investigation. 

-what about the stress that employees went through as well as passengers? Are the employees sufficiently equipped now? MP: We have a great training for employees when we hire them. Passengers say our service is better than any other in the industry. Our train staff on board did incredible work in this incident. 

-VIA has a reputation of being late when we speak to Canadians and Quebecers. The decline in on-time performance is getting worse as time goes by. MP: We can control when the train leaves the initial station, then we use infrastructure that we do not control. We are talking with railway operators, but we have to make do with the infrastructure we have. 

- struggling with the use of the word 'isolated'. (Several examples given from the last five years.) Trains will break down, weather will be unpredictable. Can you still with a straight face say this is isolated? MP: I can assure you that it is isolated. Those examples are outside our control: suspicious package near the track as an example. 

-this protocol should have evolved many years ago. Anything above five hours should be unacceptable. MP: The new protocols we put in place ensure that we act quickly and decisively when we BELIEVE there will be an unacceptable delay. Much earlier and much faster making decisions in real time. 

SIEMENS VENTURE TRAINSETS

-has Siemens been helping to resolve issue with new, expensive trains? Is Siemens covering costs incurred and is there response timely? MP: team at Siemens locally in Montreal of engineers in Sacramento is supportive every day. 622: working to identify mechanical aspects of secondary failure that caused shutdown of locomotive. There was 90 minutes with no electricity - no bathrooms - no A/C.

-with the new fleet, there will be adjustments and breaking-in periods. Can you characterize the transition to the new fleet? Are the Siemens trainsets working out better or worse than expected. MP: We are halfway through fleet implementation. Relationship between supplier and us is working well. Complex process to receive, test, commission and put in service the new trainsets. It is on-par with delivery of any new rolling stock.

-will the new long-distance fleet that will operate in more remote locations, provide for operation of toilets, provision of water well beyond Siemens fleet allows for? MP: Lessons learned from this event will be implemented in still-incomplete design requirements.

COMMUNICATION WITH TRANSPORT CANADA

-who opened communication between Transport Minister and VIA? MP: We follow a procedure, we had communications with Transport Canada around 1850h Saturday evening. Transport Canada officials were also in contact early Sunday afternoon, MP set up a call with [former] Minister [Pablo Rodrigues, who stepped down as Transport Minister and Quebec lieutenant to run for the leadership of the Quebec Liberal party in mid-September] Tuesday 1230h following event, should've been same day. 

-the minister wrote a letter asking VIA to do a certain number of things like the independent investigation. What about complaints you receive? RT: we handle complaints through email and other means, responded to specifically, 43 regarding 622 either to me, or M. Peloquin. We have interviewed 30 passengers at random throughout the train. That will give us better information as to what we can work toward.

-prior to this incident, when was your last conversation with Minister Rodrigues? MP: shortly after named minister, summer 2023. 

-have you discussed Cobourg incident with Minister? MP: No. I do have regular conversations with deputy minister and other officials at Transport Canada.

-Minister's letter to VIA - MP: we prepared an interim response within two weeks. Investigation will provide full response. 

RELATIONS WITH HOST RAILWAYS

-CN Rail also has freight trains running on same tracks. Can CN provide assistance, as a required need in maritime environment? CN wants to get you out of the way - should there be a more formal regulatory requirement? MP: Over 150 years railways have operated in Canada, a railroad offered assistance no matter what the problem or branding on the locomotive. The host railroad is very aware of when we are blocking their track. CN did offer to help by pushing our train out of the way. Train 24 arriving same time at that location. We can connect our train and provide the power for the disabled train. Same time frame. We work in close collaboration with CN, CP or Metrolinx at all times so there is no impediment to freight of passenger traffic.

-you do not own the railways. The infrastructure is getting old. What is your role when it comes to communicating the importance of investing in rail? MP: We only own 3% of the rail we operate on. On that 3% we have an on-time rate Montreal-Ottawa of 97%. We can control infrastructure maintenance. We can't incentivize other companies to maintain their infrastructure. 

-how are your relation with the railway owners, are they close? MP: Yes, we have a very close relationship. I speak with counterparts in those companies, but within VIA we have people who communicate with host railways. Companies have differing priorities and we talk with them to ensure everyone has a sufficient level of satisfaction. 

OTHER QUESTIONS AND MOTION

-will there be passengers service linking Vancouver, Lillooet, Prince George? Many BC'ers have more experience taking Amtrak down to Bellingham than within Canada. MP: I would love to do more to serve communities across the nation. All our rail cars and locomotives are currently being used. 

Motion to have representatives of Unifor (from the 622 train) appear before this committee. We can have passengers appear as panel in one hour, crew in another hour. Adopted.

 --- OCTOBER 3 MEETING ---

The promised next meeting was held on Thurs., October 3 (1540-1705h). Appearing before the committee was Cedryk Coderre (a passenger in car 2 of No 622), and Unifor union representatives Joel Kennedy, Director, Rail Sector and Jennifer Murray, Director, Atlantic Region (both by videoconference, denoted as UNIFOR interchangeably below). Each committee member had six minutes to question the witnesses.
I have transcribed some of the back-and-forth from the webcast of the meeting; here are the minutes.  The opening statements follow, then the questions and answers in the order asked, first from the passenger perspective, then the union perspective:

THE PASSENGER PERSPECTIVE

Recounting his trip aboard VIA No 622, Cedryk Coderre mentioned the first delay lasted one hour. Then an announcement was made that the train would be moving ahead slowly. After 30 minutes, there was a second stop for another mechanical issue. Drinks and pretzels were provided, then chocolate and alcohol, though no more cookies, or anything else about three hours into the train ride. Eventually, VIA No 24 was to come and rescue them by pushing train 622. He said 622 was pulled to a sidetrack to let a freight train pass. When connecting the two VIA trains, power and bathrooms were not available. An hour later, the passengers in his car got restless. Some tried to get an Uber! Others considered using the emergency exit. Rumours of a fight in car 1! The police arrived and removed one passenger after an altercation with crew. An hour later, the crew disappeared from Car 2 for 30 minutes, perhaps a briefing in another car. No 26 came by, and firefighters secured both trains for passenger transfer and pizzas were delivered. Generous, he thought - he got four slices [to laughter, or in Parliamentary terms, "Voices: oh! oh!"] Transfer to train 26 was effected, though it was standing-room only. One of the crew said that this was the very last water they had to offer, just before more water and pizzas were delivered. A lot of passengers had to meet a cruise-ship departure at Quebec City and were justifiably concerned about a multi-hour delay. [This CTV News story mentions a $5,000 loss due to no-show, no-refund policy by the cruise line.]

Under questioning, M. Coderre felt communication was adequate and crew handled the situation well, unlike some other passengers' opinions! He travels a lot by rail and air, and is used to delays. Other passengers were stressed and on edge about arriving on time, trying to figure out a way to get off the train, such as calling 9-1-1. He said he did not at any point feel in danger. 

-VIA Rail management mentioned to us this was an isolated incident. Do you agree, from a passenger standpoint? CC: No, it's not frequent to be delayed for 10-12 hours, but 1-2 hour delays are frequent. Six to seven hours elapsed between the meal he had onboard and when pizza was delivered. More should be done for emergency provisions - besides just chocolate and pretzels. 

-was the VIA description of the handling of the incident inconsistent with your experience on the train? CC:The one thing that really stood out was....hard to recollect. 

-would you prefer more frequent updates with bad news or no news? CC [to laughter]: If VIA can avoid getting to the point where they have no plans, that would be ideal! He received a refund and a 100% travel credit. 

-Were you made aware of a complaint resolution process by VIA beyond those compensations? CC: No.

-What about reports of police escorting someone from the train? CC: I witnessed this, not sure who or why. 

-would you support a passenger bill of rights similar to the airline industry? CC:Yes. 

-the train you were on was a new train, and it was unacceptable for it to fail. Was the compensation you received enough to satisfy passengers on that train? Is it lacking? CC: At first it felt generous, but the offered travel credit would likely not be used in 12 months by most of the passengers on that train. 

-was there no way for passengers to be unloaded for that train? CC: When we transferred, we were high up on the 'highway' and a lot of the passengers could not easily get off the train, especially those with disabilities. 

-how did they endure that 10-hour delay? CC: It was rougher for them. 

-how often are the trains you were riding late? CC: 40% of the time my train is late. 

-does this discourage you from taking VIA in future? CC: I take the earliest train to leave 6-8 hour buffer to ensure my connection[to laughter]. 

-any other thoughts? CC: in future, VIA could order pizzas or water or something else or much sooner - before eight hours. Staff behaviour - first four hours top service. Frustrations pile up when there is no plan. It's the company that did not give coherent messaging, not the staff. 

At CFB Gagetown, their freeze-dried foods are stocked for their troops undergoing training. Perhaps every train could have freeze-dried meals for ever passenger and staff member.

[One has to wonder if this was the best passenger to appear before the committee. One committee member wished more passengers had been available to appear.]

THE UNION/EMPLOYEE PERSPECTIVE

UNIFOR represents 9,200 in the rail sector, over 2,000 of those workers are at VIA.  Jennifer Murray spoke to the frequency of VIA Rail train delays. Her comments focused on VIA's  lack of planning overall in the rail system. Though VIA says passengers come first, their focus is on dealing with infrastructure during delays, not passengers. VIA needs to get better at serving passengers, not reducing staff and charging passengers additional fees. She disagreed that VIA's safety practices meet industry standards. Though VIA wants to deal with environmental impacts on passengers, emergency service interruptions caused by underinvestment should be the priority. For delayed trains, food, water, temperature-controlled areas and alternative transport during crises are paramount. She called into question the CEO's responses at the previous hearing. Crew facing harassing behaviour from passengers during a crisis bear the brunt. Staff is lean and under stress, she said. Even though freight lines that VIA uses are remote, there must be emergency access. Tracks should be twinned to ensure at least one track remains in service during long train delays. She called for a VIA Rail Act to be implemented, and make investment to ensure safe, resilient, on-time service. 

Under questioning, were safety management plans respected? UNIFOR: It was unsafe to detrain go another train until the situation was secured. 

-what communication practices were exercised that day? UNIFOR: It's always a struggle at the call centre to give out information to callers. 

-did you have conversations with employees on-board, or hear of practices that were not followed that day? UNIFOR: They made announcements to passengers with the limited information they had. The Ocean is notoriously many, many hours late. In the Corridor, long delays are more rare but not isolated. 

-are Unifor members involved in this incident reaching out to the union to convey concerns? UNIFOR: Not to our office, but likely elsewhere. 

-is Unifor engaged with VIA in its climate change planning? UNIFOR: has not been consulted. 

-what would he like to see in terms of government's role in consultation? UNIFOR: Changes to Railway Act or other regulation require union consultation. If we were consulted, Unifor would have a representative at the table. Unifor members are holding the train together in this type of situation. A passenger bill of rights would also be supported by Unifor.

-does Unifor have examples where tracks could be twinned to prevent service disruptions? UNIFOR: We need dedicated passenger rail trackage. For emergency situations, those tracks need to be twinned. 

-what does Unifor see as the biggest takeaways from this incident? What can the Committee do in terms of specific recommendations to prevent such incidents? UNIFOR: VIA is lacking emergency response plans and better emergency preparedness. 

-did Unifor get a comprehensive report or suggestions from staff on that particular train regarding how to deal with a similar event in the future? UNIFOR: We haven't seen anything, though it's not the first time for some of these employees. 

-did your union engage with these employees? UNIFOR: It's a great idea, and also for VIA to engage in a conversation with their staff so they can hear how this can be done better. It's VIA that will be implementing things going forward and they should care enough to hear from them. The on-board crew heard what the passengers heard - that there was no plan. 

-the committee would appreciate anything they could share from Unifor. UNIFOR: Two years ago, there was a 14-hour delay to a train, we talked to VIA Rail officials that assured us there would be changes. 

-did anything change internally for the crews? UNIFOR: Not that we know of. For many years of these long delays occurring, there has been a decision for more frequent communication, even if there's no information. 

-were your members asked for input that could inform VIA's response in future incidents? UNIFOR: Not to our knowledge; Unifor was not consulted. We're not consulted unless the companies are compelled to consult with us. We bring valuable information up from the ranks from health & safety committees, but not being consulted is problematic for us. 

-did VIA's personnel do the best they could given their limitations, or could they or the company have responded differently given the restraints? UNIFOR: The on-board crews are trained for only short, 2-3 hour delays. Larger delays often require on-board crew to rely on management. So resources coming from the company perspective: planning, training and resources are required.

-is VIA's resource amount enough, or is it the allocation? UNIFOR: VIA does not improve its passenger-related systems, despite the purchase of new trains, to support their passengers and their emergency preparedness. What if this was in Northern Manitoba at -40C? We need to look at VIA Rail's planning. An independent report was commissioned in the Cobourg incident. Unifor is not privy to that report or its results. VIA should be sharing that with the union and the workers that keep the trains going, and I'm surprised they haven't. 

-did VIA set your members up for failure? UNIFOR: It is the employer's responsibility to ensure our members' health and safety. Their lack of investment put our members in harm's way that day. 

-have you heard experience with trains delayed on the Ocean? UNIFOR: There was an ice storm with trees fallen on tracks; a difficult time for crews and passengers and delayed the train greatly. The union at that time went to VIA and begged them to listen to the workers' experience. We were given an opportunity to meet and the workers talked to the employer and expressed their concerns.

-what about employees' conduct that was questionable, such as Car 1 VIA employee lashing out at passenger [grabbing his phone]? What disciplinary measures were taken? UNIFOR: Well, it's an indication of what happens when employees are unprepared for what takes place. 

[VIA may discontinue J-trains due to issues with MU controls and communications among Siemens sets : VIA No 633 rescued by VIA No 631 on March 16, 2024 - MU failure causing 2 extra hours delay; VIA No 622 being rescued by VIA No 24 on Aug 31, 2024 - rescue failed due to MU issues.]

--- OCTOBER 10 MEETING ---

Another meeting was scheduled for Thursday, October 10 (1530-1730 h). Witnesses appearing: Hon. Anita Anand, Minister of Transport and from the Department of Transport: Arun Thangaraj, Deputy Minister; Lisa Setlakwe, Assistant Deputy Minister, Safety and Security; Craig Hutton, Associate Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy; Stephen Scott, Director General, Rail Safety and Security.
I have transcribed some of the remarks from the webcast. Here are the minutes. Questions from committee members in the order asked, with answers by Anita Anand (AA), Arun Thangaraj (AT), Lisa Setlakwe (LS), Craig Hutton (CH) or Stephen Scott (SS) as appropriate. 

Opening remarks by Minister Anand...I was shocked to hear about the treatment of the passengers stranded 10 hours...physical and psychological discomfort. Completely unacceptable, frustrating, disappointing, but VIA Rail has a responsibility to passengers' health and well-being. Passengers deserved much better treatment on August 31. Mechanical failures on the train are being studied by VIA Rail. But mechanical breakdown does not justify the 10 hours with limited access to essential services. I stepped in and met with VIA executives. Immediately after the incident we demanded VIA Rail take concrete steps and report back to ensure it doesn't happen again. Simply put, VIA Rail has to improve employee training, providing updates to passengers on their trains more frequently, and review incident procedures so that passengers receive a basic standard of care and are treated with dignity. We asked for a robust, updated emergency response action plan in 30 days - not yet received. We will keep demanding VIA provide a reliable rail service that meets the needs of all Canadians. I am pushing VIA Rail to treat their passengers with dignity and respect. Our government's priority is to reduce the number of delays and ensure VIA do better for its passengers.

Under questioning with Minister Anita Anand (AA):
-can you commit that VIA Rail limit their delays to 5 hours? How often do you talk to Transport Canada? Referred to Deputy Minister. Immediately after the incident, the previous Minister spoke to the CEO of VIA Rail. The former Minister, Pablo Rodrigues was asked to appear in a Unanimous Consent motion. 

-VIA Rail mentioned numerous causes for the incident i.e. host railways, environmental. How will High Speed Rail (HSR), [and High Frequency Rail (HFR)] change the face of passenger rail service? AA: There needs to be predictability at VIA Rail - right now! We continue to discuss incidents. We need infrastructure for Canadians today and for the future - a priority for our government but not the Opposition! We are looking at three HSR/HFR projects at the moment that we hope will benefit Canada. I will be asking VIA for additional HSR/HFR projects.

-the role of Transport Canada and VIA Rail. What is the relationship between you, your staff and VIA Rail? AA: A basic fact - VIA is a Crown corporation, operationally separate from the Government of Canada - their sole shareholder. We can set broad policy parameters, but such a situation as we are discussing is the responsibility of VIA Rail to address it. 

-I am pleasantly surprised you were able to speak to senior management at VIA since you've been appointed. I do not blame you personally, I blame VIA for its poor management, bad service delivery. If there is blame to lay on the government, it is to do with the late implementation of HFR, obsolete trains and they come back to haunt us time and time again. AA: I completely agree with you. Such incidents are unacceptable, whether they happen once, twice or more. As Minister for only three weeks, I told senior VIA leadership the situation is unacceptable. I want updates going forward - a communications protocol and what their plan is to offer exceptional service to passengers. 

-dedicated tracks and renewing the fleet of VIA trains that date back to the 1950s, I do not feel a sense of urgency, nor that there is money attached. What's coming up in terms of concrete measures? AA: New trains are entering service in the Corridor. We have announced an investment of new cars now in the pre-procurement stage. Our investments from 2021 to 2024 have been in the millions of dollars and show our interest in renewing the fleet. Deputy Minister: Siemens contract let in 2018.

-a passenger from train 622 testified before our Committee, as did VIA employee representatives. In the wake of the investigation you're holding, if VIA needs more financial resources, will you provide them? AA: We as a government take this file very seriously. In my calls to the VIA CEO and Board Chair, a lack of supplies and facilities [clearly] is not a financial issue. We will consider a funding request, but there are things they can do right now to prevent this happening again.

-the December, 2022 incident...AA: Processes from 2022 were in place but not followed. Management and crew require more training. From a ministerial and government level, we have a responsibility to demand better. 

-HFR is a known priority for the future. What about passenger service outside the Corridor? There are fewer options than in the last hundred years for rural Canadians. What is your vision? AA: I come from rural Canada, Kentville in Nova Scotia's Annapolis Valley, and I appreciate your question. We have a challenging geography my department needs to address, ensuring adequate access that is innovative. HFR/HSR is just one priority.

-the then-CEO of VIA was here after the December, 2022 Cobourg incident, and said he had not heard from your ministerial counterpart at that time. Airport authorities also had not after delays in air travel. How will this be different with you as Minister? Previous Minister was missing in action. AA: It will be different. I have talked to VIA CEO and airline CEOs. I take this job seriously and will continue to work on behalf of Canadians who need rail service for the economy and basic transport and connectivity in this country. I deeply resent the implication that I'm not on top of this file!

AA: As of September 3, 2024 VIA implemented a new escalation protocol on trains and operations control centre. TC is immediately notified and after a 2-hour delay, VIA starts arranging alternative transportation. In-person training sessions for leadership and employees responsible for operations were held in September re: emergency and crisis management plans. VIA commissioned two reports. One on understanding operational gaps that led to the incident and another on mechanical factors that led to it. I have received a response from VIA on what it is doing, and I do not speak for VIA. They are accountable and need to come and tell this Committee what they are doing and what they have done.

- do you feel confident VIA Rail can achieve the results, and can there be consequences? AA: That's why I spoke to the Board Chair and CEO separately. Every time there is a new Chair, we put forward a letter of expectation, and the Board has to keep executives accountable. Only after speaking with the Chair did I speak to VIA's CEO and about the implementation of the steps in Minister Rodrigues' plan after the incident.

Motion to invite the Minister back to the Committee before Christmas Break. There is already another invitation on the table.

-investing in the long-distance fleet. Your plan to privatize the Corridor is going to starve VIA Rail of 95% of its passenger revenue. AA: It's not a question of privatization. It's a public-private partnership with those who have experience. The public sector will have a role, naturally. AT: then VIA can focus their operational focus on Ocean, Canadian, Churchill etc.

-as the representative of the sole shareholder of VIA Rail, can you assure us that we will see measurable improvement in services offered to Canadian rail passengers? AA: I guarantee I will exercise my authority to fulfill my oversight role. I will include the letter of expectations and letter my predecessor delivered to VIA Rail. Everything will be in place by Q1 of 2025. 

-do you feel VIA, in a multimodal network, can handle future expectations on levels of service? AA: The investments we have made as a government to rebuild its fleet (listed $ amounts allocated over several years) totalling 790 million dollars, compared to 2010-2013 Conservative government - zero.

Motion of unanimous consent to request the Minister to provide letters of expectation sent to VIA Rail. Adopted.

Questioning of Deputy Ministers:

-comments on action plans and protocol changes after Cobourg incident? AT: communications with our department re: escalation. LS: they did not communicate with us when they detected a delay, and we have strengthened that protocol requirement for delays over three hours. 

-when did Transport Canada first learn of the delay to VIA train 622? LS: initial delay 1120, we were first aware about 1845. They are to update us on an hourly basis. We had communication throughout. It's up to VIA to call upon resources available to them. They have to make the arrangements with bus operators. 

Unanimous consent Motion to have former minister Pablo Rodrigues attend to discuss communications between his office, Transport Canada and VIA. No objection.

-the VIA CEO said that VIA was making a complete assessment of the Quebec incident. Are you aware of the discussions between VIA and Siemens to determine cause of mechanical breakdown? LS: their investigation is their own initiative and will share insights of research when it's released. We are conducting our own investigation to understand what exactly broke down mechanically speaking on that train. The deadline is not specific but it will be in the months to come. They don't know where there investigation is going to take them. 

-have there been other major mechanical problems with the new Siemens trains? CH: From a regulator's perspective, we're not aware of a systemic issue with the fleet at this time. LS: This is a new technology so of course there will be adjustments to be made, but there are no problems with the new equipment to date.

-the former Minister of Transport required a better emergency plan and communication protocol from VIA to Transport Canada 30 days following his appearance at the Committee in September. What is Transport Canada's role in these efforts? SS: We will review the reports and findings that VIA commissions and provides to us. We do our own review to ensure we're satisfied with the fleet. If extra actions should be taken from a safety aspect, we can impose those as a regulator. LS: After the Quebec incident, we inspected the train and found no cases of non-compliance with our standards. As the Minister said, we are expecting the report and recommendations in the first part of 2024.

-we learned train 622 was stalled at the time during the Quebec incident. What kind of procedures should be implemented for passenger safety? SS: the procedure to follow when a new train is brought on is the following. VIA needs to fulfill obligations as a regulated entity, to provide assurances to us as a regulator that the new fleet meets the safety standards. We do a due diligence review on that. Dry-run inspections before the fleet is introduced...a lot of engineering...the company has a series of pre-commissioning dry-runs, milestones and procedures. We don't have an official certification role, we do a due diligence review with any new fleet. 

-long-haul fleet Canadian, Ocean fleet will consist of locomotives, specialty cars etc. VIA has said their fleet will not be functional in 10 years. AT: RFI for market sounding of what is available, based on the information being reviewed, they will look at how they structure a RFQ and RFP for that fleet. Objective for deployment of the new fleet is unknown to us right now. 

-has the problem been solved that caused the mechanical breakdown? LS: the problem was fixed. There were mechanical issues and there was no crew or equipment to fix the train onsite. At Transport Canada, we asked if this problem could appear in other cars? We will see the results of the investigation, but this is not a systemic issue.

-the three-hour notification protocol seems short. How often is Transport Canada notified by VIA of such delays. LS: I can get back to you with that data. CH: There is no similar operational delay notification with airlines, except weather delays or cancellations beyond an hour that will impact other airlines or passengers. LS: If VIA had notified us at the three-hour mark in Quebec? Our mandate is about the safety of passengers. We will reassure ourselves that they are taking the steps necessary. Do passengers need transferring? We are not prescriptive of their plans. AT: Operational response is solely the responsibility of VIA Rail. We are informed to ensure safety aspects are covered off. Our role kicks in if it's a derailment or fatality. They have to communicate with us in a timely manner so we can provide assurances around safety. We will not dictate the operational response.

-was appropriate compensation given to the passengers, based on the passenger testimony at this committee? AT: As part of the Minister's request to VIA Rail, details of how VIA communicates with its passengers and resolves complaints. VIA has confirmed 24/7 communication with passengers and the public, and what passengers can expect as part of their responsibility. We have looked at the issue of passenger rights. VIA has put information on their website, and as operator they are in the best position to be responsive to their customers to address these situations.

-are you aware of the ongoing discussions between VIA and Siemens to determine cause of mechanical breakdown? LS: As part of the investigation response from VIA, we have learned that we will be made aware that the report will be available to us by mid-November, earlier than I had said previously. We will take that report as useful to us, also doing our own assessment of that report and what transpired.

-are you aware of any other significant mechanical breakdowns with these new trains? LS: No.

-when I think about the 10-hour delay to 622, was it due to a lack of protocol in place at the time, or a failure in following existing procedures? LS: there was a confluence of events, part of it was mechanical in the sense that there was a hose that got worn, couldn't be repaired on site. Mechanical assistance was required from elsewhere. There was an issue with the train that was to rescue 622. There was some lack of training of personnel on the train as well. That's what has been identified so far. 

-we heard from passengers on 622, and news reports as well. I've taken multiple VIA Rail trains. There might be three pretzels in their pretzel bags. It's not sustenance. In the letter sent by Minister Rodrigues, asking for changes at VIA Rail, I saw nothing about passenger supply of food. AT: water, food, working lavatories are essential. As part of the escalation process at the second hour, they will take into consideration all those factors when making that decision. This is up to VIA Rail to manage and that they will take action accordingly. 

-Transport Action Canada recommended that VIA treat trains broken-down as trains in a station, that protects them from other trains and protect passengers. SS: I'm not familiar with that specific requirement. There are emergency broadcast requirements with Rail Traffic Control centres to alert nearby trains. A disruption should not cause other problems. 

-has Transport Canada done a study of fleet loss and a possible loss of service to routes? The CEO of VIA said their mechanics are performing miracles to keep the old fleet in service. AT: We do have a date of 2034 [for withdrawal and replacement of the fleet]. I would have to verify such a study.

-can dry Army-type rations be stored on trains, and can that be regulated by Transport Canada? AT: we'd have to look at our legal authorities, it would fall under operational remit of VIA Rail so I will raise that with the Chair and CEO. 

Running extra...

Barely will the pixels be propagated in this propitious post when VIA has another debacle on its hands with a truck-overpass collision and a dead Venture Set 16 on VIA No 40 in Brockville mere hours apart directly delaying seven trains for up to five hours on October 22. The same complaints are raised on social media as on No 622: lack of communication, lack of food, lack of power, lack of operational options i.e. blocked single-track mainline and something new....passengers questioning whether the new CN-imposed speed reductions have negatively affected the Venture sets and jokes about...pretzels.